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Cryptanalyzing a Medical Privacy Protection
Scheme based on DNA Coding and Chaos
Lei Chen, Chengqing Li
Abstract—Recently, a medical privacy protection scheme
(MPPS) based on DNA encoding and chaos was proposed in
[IEEE Trans. Nanobioscience, vol. 16, pp. 850–858, 2017]. This
paper reports some properties of MPPS and proposes a chosen-
plaintext attack on it. In addition, the other claimed superiorities
are questioned from the viewpoint of modern cryptography. Both
theoretical analysis and experimental results are provided to
support the feasibility of the attack and other security defects.
The proposed cryptanalysis will promote proper application of
DND encoding in protecting multimedia data including DICOM
image.
Index Terms—cryptanalysis, chaotic cryptography, DNA en-
coding, image security, privacy protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) encoding is widely used inmedical image encryption and privacy protection in the
past two decades [1], [2]. The first one is proposed in 2004
[3]. Unfortunately, some encryption schemes based on DNA
encoding were reported to insecure of different extents [4]–
[13].
The development of transmission and sensing technologies
promote remote diagnosis (telediagnosis) and remote surgery
(telesurgery). The concerns on security and privacy on the
medical images transmitted on public channels are becoming
more and more serious. Due to the bulky size of medical image
and special storage format, the traditional text encryption
standards are not efficient [14]. The directly optimized way
is to reduce the size of encryption object by automatically
detecting the region of interest (ROI) and leaving the region
of non-interest (RONI) as plain-form. As the equivalent coun-
terpart of cryptography, the object of cryptanalysis is to obtain
the information on secret-key and/or plaintext under a given
attacking scenario [15]–[18].
The randomness of the pseudo-random number sequences
generated by iterating a chaotic map in digital computer may
be very weaker than that of the counterpart obtained in infinite
domain [19]. As reviewed in [20], various methods were
proposed to counteract the dynamics degradation of digital
chaotic maps: selecting state and control parameters; increas-
ing the arithmetic precision; perturbing states; perturbing the
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control parameters; switching among multiple chaotic maps;
cascading multiple chaotic maps [21], [22]. The review on
chaotic cryptology can be found in [23]–[25].
In [26], a medical privacy protection scheme (MPPS) based
on DNA and chaos was proposed. The images stored as
DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine)
standard are encrypted with DNA encoding and PRNSs gen-
erated by iterating two Coupled Chaotic Systems (CCS).
This paper focuses on security analysis of MPPS. Some
properties on its essential structure are found and proved,
which is then used to support an efficient chosen-plaintext
attack. The metrics on validating security performance of
MPPS are convincingly questioned.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
concisely present the medical privacy protection scheme un-
der study. Detailed cryptanalyses are given in Sec. III with
experimental results. The last section concludes the paper.
II. THE CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF MPPS
As specified in [26, Sec. III], MPPS can protect DICOM
image data with two modes: partial and full encryption. If
the former is adopted, only the significant areas for diag-
nosis are encrypted to considerably reduce the size of the
encryption object. Except the difference on selected portions
of the plain-image, MPPS works exactly the same under
the two modes. Without loss of generality, the encryption
object of MPPS is assumed to be a RGB color image I =
{Ir, Ig, Ib} of size M × N for either mode, which can be
represented with three two-dimensional 8-bit integer matrixes:
Ir = {Ir(i, j)}M,Ni=1,j=1, Ig = {Ig(i, j)}M,Ni=1,j=1 and Ib =
{Ib(i, j)}M,Ni=1,j=1. Accordingly, I ′ = {I ′r, I ′g, I ′b} is the cipher-
image, where I ′r = {I ′r(i, j)}M,Ni=1,j=1, I ′g = {I ′g(i, j)}M,Ni=1,j=1
and I ′b = {I ′b(i, j)}M,Ni=1,j=1. Then, the basic parts of MPPS
can be described as follows1.
• The secret key is composed of six sets of initial value
and control parameter {(Ym(0), µm)}6m=1 = {Km}6m=1.
The sub-keys K1 and K3 are the initial values and control
parameters of Coupled Logistic-Sine (CLS) map
y = f(x) + 14 · (4− µ) · sin(pix) mod 1, (1)
where
f(x) = µ · x · (1− x) (2)
1To make the description more concise and complete, some details and
symbols in [26] are modified under the precondition its security performance
is kept unchanged.
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is the Logistic map. The other sub-keys, K2, K4, K5 and
K6, are sets of the initial values and control parameters of
Coupled Logistic-Tent (CLT) map
y =
{
f(x) + 12 (4− µ) · x mod 1 if x < 0.5;
f(x) + 12 (4− µ) · (1− x) mod 1 if x ≥ 0.5,
(3)
where x ∈ [0, 1], and µ ∈ [0, 4].
• Initialization:
1) Generating index sequence: iterate CLS map (1) t1 times
from the initial condition Y1(0) with control parameter µ1
to avoid the transient effect; iterate it 3 ·M ·N more times
to obtain a chaotic state sequence X1 = {X1(i)}3MNi=1 ;
sort X1 in an ascending order to generate an index
sequence S1 = {S1(i)}3MNi=1 satisfying that X1(S1(i))
is the i-th largest element of X1.
2) Determining DNA coding rules: iterate the CLT map
(3) with control parameter µ2 from the initial condition
Y2(0) t2 = 100 times to avoid the transient effect;
iterate it six more times to obtain a chaotic sequence
X2 = {X2(i)}6i=1 and quantize it to get six random
numbers {S2(i)}6i=1 via
S2(i) = bX2(i)× 1014c mod 8, (4)
where bxc returns the nearest integers less than or equal
to x.
3) Constructing a pseudo-random number generator: start-
ing from the initial condition Y3(0), iterate CLT map
(3) t3 times with control parameter µ3; iterate the map
4 · M · N more times to obtain a chaotic sequence
X3 = {X3(i)}4MNi=1 and quantize to a binary random
sequence S3 = {S3(i)}4MNi=1 by
S3(i) =
{
0 if 0 ≤ X3(i) ≤ 0.5;
1 if 0.5 < X3(i) < 1.
(5)
4) Generating three keystreams S4, S5, S6: Similar to 1), set
three sub-keys K4, K5 and K6 as the control parameter
and initial state of CLS map (1), generate three chaotic
sequences X4 = {X4(i)}MNi=1 , X5 = {X5(i)}MNi=1 and
X6 = {X6(i)}MNi=1 , respectively. As above, the first tm
states are discarded for generating Sm, where m = 4, 5, 6.
Then, every element of such sequences is quantified by
Sm(i) = bXm(i) · 1014c mod 256. (6)
• Encryption procedure:
a) Permutation: the three matrixes Ir, Ig , and Ib are
“placed” vertically to obtain a large image P =
[P (i, j)]3M,Ni=1,j=1, where the elements of [P (i, j)]
M,N
i=1,j=1,
[P (i, j)]2M,Ni=M+1,j=1 and [P (i, j)]
3M,N
i=2M+1,j=1 are set by
that of Ir, Ig , and Ib pixel by pixel, respectively. Then,
produce a scrambled image P ? = {P ?(i, j)}3M,Ni=1,j=1 from
P by the index sequence S1: P ?(i, j) = P (u, v), where{
u = bS1((i−1)·N+j)N c+ 1;
v = S1((i− 1) ·N + j) mod N + 1.
TABLE I
EIGHT DIFFERENT DNA CODING RULES
Rule number (00)2 (01)2 (10)2 (11)2
1 A C G T
2 A G C T
3 T G C A
4 T C G A
5 C A T G
6 C T A G
7 G A T C
8 G T A C
b) DNA Encoding: First, assign Ei = X2(i) for i = 1 ∼ 3.
Using function
f(x) = (x0, x1, x2, x3) (7)
satisfying
∑3
i=0 xi · 22i = x to transform ev-
ery pixel of [P ?(i, j)]M,Ni=1,j=1, [P
?(i, j)]2M,Ni=M+1,j=1, and
[P ?(i, j)]3M,Ni=2M+1,j=1 into four neighboring elements of
2-bit integer matrixes of size M × 4N , I?r , I?g , and I?b ,
respectively. Finally, convert I?r , I
?
g , and I
?
b into DNA
symbol matrixes with the rules in the E1-th, E2-th, and
E3-th row of Table I, respectively. Let R, G, and B
denote the corresponding results.
c) Diffusion I with DNA complement: Obtain matrix R∗ =
{R∗(i, j)}M,4Ni=1,j=1 by
R∗(i, j) =
{
R(i, j) if S3(i) = 0;
g(R(i, j)) if S3(i) = 1,
(8)
where
g(x) =

T if x = “A”;
C if x = “T”;
G if x = “C”;
A if x = “G”.
(9)
d) Diffusion II: According to DNA addition operation rules
given in the Table II, calculate
R∗∗(i, j) = R∗(i, j)B∗(i, j)
R∗∗(i, j) = G∗(i, j)R∗(i, j)
R∗∗(i, j) = B∗(i, j)G∗(i, j)
(10)
for i = 1 ∼M , j = 1 ∼ 4N .
e) DNA Decoding: First, assign Di = X2(i+3) for i = 1 ∼
3. Then, convert DNA symbol matrixes R∗∗, G∗∗, and
B∗∗ into 2-bit integer matrixes with the rule in the D1-th,
D2-th, and D3-th rows of B∗∗, respectively. Accordingly,
B∗∗, B∗∗, and B∗∗ are generated. Finally, transform
R??, G??, and B?? into I∗∗r , I
∗∗
g , and I
∗∗
b , respectively.
In such transforms, every four 2-bit integer elements are
merged into one 8-bit integer with the inverse function of
Eq. (7).
f) Diffusion III: Considering every 2-D matrix as a 1-
D sequence by scanning it in the raster order, obtain
I ′r, I
′
g, I
′
b by calculating
I ′r(i) = I
′
r(i− 1)⊕ I∗∗r (i)⊕ S4(i)
I ′g(i) = I
′
g(i− 1)⊕ I∗∗g (i)⊕ I∗∗b (i)⊕ S5(i)
I ′b(i) = I
′
b(i− 1)⊕ I∗∗b (i)⊕ I∗∗r (i)⊕ S6(i)
(11)
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for i = 1 ∼ MN , ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive OR
operation, I ′r(0) = 0, I
′
g(0) = 0 and I
′
b(0) = 0.
• Decryption procedure: The decryption procedure is the
inverse of the above encryption procedure. The DNA sub-
traction rules are shown in Table III.
TABLE II
DNA ADDITION RULES
 A G C T
A A G C T
G G C T A
C C T A G
T T A G C
TABLE III
DNA SUBTRACTION RULES
 A G C T
A A T C G
G G A T C
C C G A T
T T C G A
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF MPPS
In this section, some properties related to MPPS and DNA
coding are first analyzed. Then a detailed cryptanalysis un-
der chosen-plaintext attack is proposed. Next attack process
and simulation results are given. Evaluation on other attack
analysis is finally presented.
A. Some properties of MPPS
Before the cryptanalysis, some properties of MPPS and
DNA encoding/decoding are analyzed and summarized.
Property 1. Given two arbitrary cipher-images, Cu =
[Cu(i)]
3MN
i=1 and Cv = [Cv(i)]
3MN
i=1 , their difference ∆C is
independent of the keys or equivalent keys K4 (S4), K5 (S5)
and K6 (S6), where ∆C = Cu⊕Cv = [Cu(i)⊕Cv(i)]3MNi=1 .
Proof: Observing Eq. (11), one has
∆Cr(i)⊕∆Cr(i− 1) = ∆C˜r(i);
∆Cg(i)⊕∆Cg(i− 1) = ∆C˜g(i)⊕∆C˜b(i);
∆Cb(i)⊕∆Cb(i− 1) = ∆C˜b(i)⊕∆C˜r(i),
(12)
where ∆ϕ = ϕu ⊕ ϕv and ϕ ∈ {Cr(i), Cg(i), Cb(i),
C˜r(i), C˜g(i), C˜b(i)}. Hence the property is proved.
For convenience, here we define two composite functions
Fi,j(x) = f
−1
j [fi(x)] and Gi,j(x) = f
−1
j [g[fi(x)]], where
fi(x), f−1j (x) and g(x) are the DNA coding, decoding and
transformation mentioned in the previous section, where x ∈
Z4 and i, j ∈ Z8.
Property 2. If x1, x2 ∈ x and x1 ⊕ x2 = (11)2 = 3,
Fi,j(x1)⊕ Fi,j(x2) 6= Gi,j(x1)⊕Gi,j(x2). (13)
Proof: Considering the complementary of DNA (i.e., A
and T, C and G), for i ∈ Z8, there exists
(fi(x1), fi(x2)) ∈ {(A, T ), (T,A), (C,G), (G,C)}.
According to Eq. (9), one has
(g[fi(x1)], g[fi(x2)]) ∈ {(T,C), (C, T ), (G,A), (C,G)}.
For i, j ∈ Z8, if x1 ⊕ x2 = (11)2 = 3, then{
Fi,j(x1)⊕ Fi,j(x2) = (11)2,
Gi,j(x1)⊕Gi,j(x2) = (10)2 or (01)2.
(14)
(15)
Obviously, Fi,j(x1)⊕ Fi,j(x2) 6= Gi,j(x1)⊕Gi,j(x2).
Property 3. The composite functions Fi,j(x) and Gi,j(x) are
bidirectional maps defined in domain Z4, and they only have
8 and 16 different maps, respectively.
Proof: First, since fi(x) and f−1j (x) for i, j ∈ Z8 and
g(x) are fixed bidirectional maps in domain Z4, Fi,j(x) =
f−1j [fi(x)] and Gi,j(x) = f
−1
j [g[fi(x)]] are also fixed bidi-
rectional maps. Considering the constraints of Eq. (14), one
can determine the number of satisfied maps of Fi,j(x) and
Gi,j(x) is C12C
1
2C
1
2 = 8 and C
1
4C
1
2C
1
2 = 16, respectively.
Property 4. If i1, i2 ∈ i, j1, j2 ∈ j, there are two different
maps Fi1,j1(x), Fi2,j2(x) satisfying
Fi1,j1(x)⊕ Fi2,j2(x) = λ (16)
for x = 0, 1, 2, 3, where λ = 1, 2 or 3.
Proof: The above proposition is equivalent to another
proposition: if Fi1,j1(x) is one of maps of Fi,j(x), then
Fi2,j2(x) = Fi1,j1(x)⊕ λ is another map. Since Fi2,j2(x1)⊕
Fi2,j2(x2) = Fi1,j1(x1)⊕Fi1,j1(x2), x1, x2 ∈ x, according to
Property 2, Fi2,j2(x1) is another map of Fi,j(x).
Property 5. If i1, i2 ∈ i, j1, j2 ∈ j, there are two different
maps Gi1,j1(x) 6= Gi2,j2(x) satisfying
Gi1,j1(x)⊕Gi2,j2(x) = λ (17)
for x = 0, 1, 2, 3, where λ = 1, 2 or 3.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Property 4.
TABLE IV
THE ORIGINAL KEYS AND THE CORRESPONDING EQUIVALENT KEYS OF
MPPS.
Original
keys
Corresponding
equivalent keys
Related information
K1 S1 Permutation index sequence
K2 E1, E2, E3 and
D1, D2, D3
DNA coding and decoding rules
K3 S3 Binary sequence
K4 S4 Keystream of r plane
K5 S5 Keystream of g plane
K6 S6 Keystream of b plane
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B. Breaking MPPS under chosen-plaintext attack
The corresponding equivalent keys and related information
of the six keys of MPPS are shown in Table IV. The goal of
cryptanalysis of the paper is to reveal these equivalent keys
under chosen-plaintext attack.
First, we choose a group of color plain-images whose
all pixel values are equal, represented as a set of images
P = {P0,P1, . . . ,P255} where P0 = {0, 0, 0, . . . , 0},
P1 = {1, 1, 1, . . . , 1} and P255 = {255, 255, 255, . . . , 255}.
Suppose their corresponding cipher-images set is C =
{C0,C1, . . . ,C255}. Obviously, these images before and after
the permutation are unchanged, that is, the corresponding
images satisfy P˜0 = P0, P˜1 = P1, . . ., P˜255 = P255.
Hence, we only need to focus on all intermediate states
from the permutation-images to the cipher-images. Recall the
description of MPPS, the DNA coding and diffusion operations
after the permutation are carried out in the r, g and b planes
of the images respectively. To reveal the keys of these planes,
a divide-and-conquer strategy is adapted in the cryptanalysis
as follows.
1) Cracking the r plane: In this plane, we will reveal
the equivalent keys E1, D1, S3 and S4. First, choose two
special images Pα1,Pα2, which satisfy Pα1,Pα2 ∈ P and
Pα1  Pα2 = P255. Obviously, there are (C14 )4 = 256
plain-image pairs in set P that meet. As mentioned earlier,
their permutation-images are unchanged, i.e., P˜α1 = Pα1 and
P˜α2 = Pα2. Subsequently, in the r plane of P˜α1 and P˜α2
, each of two-bit elements (denoted as x1 = α1 mod 4 and
x2 = α2 mod 4) is DNA encoded (fi(xk)), transformed (Eqs.
(8,9)) and decoded(f−1j (xk)), then the output IR1s(k) can be
represented in two forms
IR1s(k) =
{
Fi,j(xk), if S3(k) = 0
Gi,j(xk), if S3(k) = 1
(18)
where x1, x2 ∈ xk, k = 1 ∼ 4MN and i, j ∈ Z8. From
Property 2 and Eq. (14), the differential ∆IR1s(k) satisfies{
Fi,j(x1)⊕ Fi,j(x2) = (11)2, if S3(k) = 0
Gi,j(x1)⊕Gi,j(x2) = (01)2 or (10)2. if S3(k) = 1
(19)
According to the above equation, if the output ∆IR1s(k) is
known, then S3(k) can be uniquely determined. Fortunately,
by Property 1 and Eq. (12), ∆IR1s(k) can be obtained by
dividing ∆C˜r(i) into four two-bit elements, and the differen-
tial pixel ∆C˜r(i) is available from ∆Cr(i) . So the binary
sequence S3 is revealed.
The next goal is to obtain E1, D1 and S4. Since the
key space of E1 and D1 is very small, only 8 × 8 = 64,
we design an effective exhaustive search method for the
keys, as summarized in Algorithm 1. The main idea is
that we reveal same S4 for different plain-images when the
exhaustive key E1 and D1 are correct. Also, considering
x ∈ Z4 for FE1,D1(x) and GE1,D1(x), so we choose only four
special image pairs (P0,C0), (P85,C85), (P170,C170), and
(P255,C255), which correspond to different plain-pixel values
(00000000)2, (01010101)2, (10101010)2 and (11111111)2,
respectively. Before Algorithm 1 is executed, the plain-image
Cu will be converted to an intermediate image CCu, u =
{0, 1, 2, 3}. Formula (11) first can be converted to
Cr(i)⊕ Cr(i− 1) = C˜r(i)⊕ S4(i);
Cg(i)⊕ Cg(i− 1) = C˜g(i)⊕ C˜b(i)⊕ S5(i);
Cb(i)⊕ Cb(i− 1) = C˜b(i)⊕ C˜r(i)⊕ S6(i).
(20)
Furthermore, one has
CRs(i)⊕ CRs(i− 1) = C˜Rs(i)⊕ S4(i);
CGs(i)⊕ CGs(i− 1)⊕ CRs(i)⊕ CRs(i− 1)⊕
CBs(i)⊕ CBs(i− 1)
= C˜Gs(i)⊕ S4(i)⊕ S5(i)⊕ S6(i);
CBs(i)⊕ CBs(i− 1)⊕ CRs(i)⊕ CRs(i− 1)
= C˜Bs(i)⊕ S4(i)⊕ S6(i).
(21)
The above equation shows that one can obtain three sub-
images from C, i.e., C˜r(i)⊕S4, C˜g(i)⊕S5 ⊕S4 ⊕S6 and
C˜b(i)⊕S6⊕S4 without the keys. The joint of the sub-images
is defined as the intermediate cipher-image CCu.
Interestingly, the values E1, D1 and S4 searched by the
Algorithm 1 are not unique. In other words, there are four
equivalent classes in the table, and each class has 16 different
equivalent keys, as listed in Table V. For example, suppose
MPPS encrypts the r plane with E1 = 0 and D1 = 0, then
the remaining 15 elements of the equivalent key class II can
be used to decrypt. The reasons for the results are as follows:
• Fi,j(x) and Gi,j(x) are two kind of transformations of
the r plane. From Property 3, there are 8 and 16 satisfied
maps of Fi,j(x) and Gi,j(x), respectively, rather than the
expected 8× 8 = 64. Hence, there are several maps that
are equivalent for different i, j ∈ Z8.
• S4 also has multiple equivalent keys. S
(1)
4 and S
(2)
4 are
different equivalent keys only if Fi1,j1(x) ⊕ S(1)4 (k) =
Fi2,j2(x)⊕S(2)4 (k) and Gi1,j1(x)⊕S(1)4 (k) = Gi2,j2(x)⊕
S
(2)
4 (k)forx = 0, 1, 2, 3, are holds, where x ∈ Z4,
i, j, i′, j′ ∈ Z8 and k = 1 ∼ 4MN . The above
proposition is equivalent to Properties 4 and 5.
Note that these equivalent key sets in Table V are not finalized,
because DNA encoding rule fE1 is constrained by Eq. (10),
and we will further filter to obtain the correct keys in the next
subsection.
2) Cracking the green and blue planes: This subsection we
will crack the g and b planes and further determine a correct
set of equivalent keys for r plane.
First, in the g plane, we also apply the exhaustive search
method with the same four plain-images and intermediate
cipher-image, which is similar to Algorithm 1. But the ex-
haustive algorithm needs to consider the DNA coding rules
fE1 since the g plane is related to r plane, Overall, it needs
to search 8 × 8 × 8 = 512 times. Then we will reveal an
equivalent set of {(E1, E2, D2,S5  S4  S6)}, and further
filter a new equivalent key set of r plane.
Similarly, we will obtain another equivalent key set of
{(E2, E3, D3,S6S4)} plane and the existing equivalent key
sets of g is refined. Finally, we confirm the right sets of {S6}
and {S5} 2.
2This step is optional in the attack process, Sec.III-C will gives an example.
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TABLE V
FOUR DIFFERENT EQUIVALENT KEY CLASSES FOR (E1, D1,S4)
Equivalent key classes I Equivalent key classes II Equivalent key classes III Equivalent key classes IV
(0, 0,S
(1,1)
4 )
1, (4, 4,S(1,1)4 ) (0, 1,S
(2,1)
4 ), (4, 5,S
(2,1)
4 ) (1, 1,S
(3,1)
4 ), (5, 5,S
(3,1)
4 ) (1, 0,S
(4,1)
4 ), (5, 4,S
(4,1)
4 )
(0, 2,S
(1,2)
4 ), (4, 7,S
(1,2)
4 ) (0, 3,S
(2,2)
4 ), (4, 6,S
(2,2)
4 ) (1, 3,S
(3,2)
4 ), (5, 6,S
(3,2)
4 ) (1, 2,S
(4,2)
4 ), (5, 7,S
(4,2)
4 )
(0, 4,S
(1,3)
4 ), (4, 0,S
(1,3)
4 ) (0, 5,S
(2,3)
4 ), (4, 1,S
(2,3)
4 ) (1, 5,S
(3,3)
4 ), (5, 1,S
(3,3)
4 ) (1, 4,S
(4,3)
4 ), (5, 0,S
(4,3)
4 )
(0, 7,S
(1,4)
4 ), (4, 2,S
(1,4)
4 ) (0, 6,S
(2,4)
4 ), (4, 3,S
(1,4)
4 ) (1, 6,S
(3,4)
4 ), (5, 3,S
(3,4)
4 ) (1, 7,S
(4,4)
4 ), (5, 2,S
(4,4)
4 )
(2, 0,S
(1,5)
4 ), (7, 4,S
(1,5)
4 ) (2, 1,S
(2,5)
4 ), (7, 5,S
(2,5)
4 ) (3, 1,S
(3,5)
4 ), (6, 5,S
(3,5)
4 ) (3, 0,S
(4,5)
4 ), (6, 4,S
(4,5)
4 )
(2, 2,S
(1,6)
4 ), (7, 7,S
(1,6)
4 ) (2, 3,S
(2,6)
4 ), (7, 6,S
(2,6)
4 ) (3, 3,S
(3,6)
4 ), (6, 6,S
(3,6)
4 ) (3, 2,S
(4,6)
4 ), (6, 7,S
(4,6)
4 )
(2, 4,S
(1,7)
4 ), (7, 0,S
(1,7)
4 ) (2, 5,S
(2,7)
4 ), (7, 1,S
(2,7)
4 ) (3, 5,S
(3,7)
4 ), (6, 1,S
(3,7)
4 ) (3, 4,S
(4,7)
4 ), (6, 0,S
(4,7)
4 )
(2, 7,S
(1,8)
4 ), (7, 2,S
(1,8)
4 ) (2, 6,S
(2,8)
4 ), (7, 3,S
(2,8)
4 ) (3, 6,S
(3,8)
4 ), (6, 3,S
(3,8)
4 ) (3, 7,S
(4,8)
4 ), (6, 2,S
(4,8)
4 )
1 S
(i,j)
4 represents j
th different keystream S4 in the ith equivalent classes, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}. Since the value
of S(i,j)4 depends on the original key (Y4(0), µ4), only more general relationships between them are given here.
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Fig. 1. Attack framework for obtaining all equivalent keys.
3) Revealing permutation key: Except for permutation in-
dex S1, now we obtain all the equivalent keys or equivalent
key sets in Table IV. So, we can recover the permutation-
image P˜ for any cipher-image C. Then it becomes a classic
cryptanalysis of permutation-only cipher problem, which has
been studied in depth in [27], [28]. The general way is to use
the multi-fork tree optimization method [27]. To attack MPPS,
only dlog256(3MN)e plain-images are extra chosen, here dxe
returns the nearest integers more than or equal to x.
C. Attack process and simulation results
The above theoretical analysis demonstrate that MPPS is
successfully broken with only d log256(3MN)e + 4 chosen
plain-images. Here, a complete attack example to verify the
proposed cryptanalysis method will be given.
For better presentation, assume that MPPS processes a RGB
color image of size 2 × 2 × 3, and the pixel value of each
plane range from 0 to 255. In the following simulation, set
the initial iteration of CLS or CTS map t0 = 500, and six
original keys of MPPS as listed in the second column of the
Table VI. Accordingly, the equivalent key corresponding to the
each original key is calculated by an Initialization procedure
of MPPS.
As shown in Fig. 1, we select two group of images to obtain
all the equivalent keys of MPPS. The first group includes four
special plain-images and cipher-images as
P0 = {0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0},
C0 = {198, 60, 216, 204; 107, 69, 102, 24; 49, 72, 224, 205};
P255 = {255, 255, 255, 255; 255, 255, 255, 255; 255, 255, 255, 255},
C255 = {51, 158, 39, 228; 148, 69, 153, 24; 110, 234, 181, 229};
P85 = {85, 85, 85, 85; 85, 85, 85, 85; 85, 85, 85, 85},
C85 = {108, 60, 114, 204; 59, 20, 51, 12; 49, 72, 224, 205};
P170 = {170, 170, 170, 170; 170, 170, 170, 170; 170, 170, 170, 170},
C170 = {153, 158, 141, 228; 145, 20, 153, 12; 110, 234, 181, 229}.
From Eq. (20,21), the diffusion between pixels can be elim-
inated and a intermediate image CCu, u ∈ {0, 255, 85, 170}
can be created:
CC0 = {198, 250, 228, 20; 156, 173, 111, 71; 247, 131, 76, 57};
CC255 = {51, 173, 185, 195; 201, 248, 58, 18; 93, 41, 230, 147};
CC85 = {108, 80, 78, 190; 102, 6, 193, 172; 93, 41, 230, 147};
CC170 = {153, 7, 19, 105; 102, 6, 193, 172; 247, 131, 76, 57}.
The differential pixel sequence of r plane between CC0 and
CC255 is {(11110101)2, (01010111)2, (01011101)2,
(11010111)2}. By the inverse of Eq. (19), one can determine
the value of the binary sequence
S3 = {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0}. (22)
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Algorithm 1: Exhaustive search procedure for the keys
Input: Special plain-images P0,P85,P170 and P255 and
intermediate cipher-images CC0,CC85,CC170
and CC255, DNA encoding and decoding rules
fi, f
−1
j , i, j ∈ Z8, the revealed key S3
Output: Keys E1, D1 and S4
1 function EncryptRs(P ,S3, i, j)
2 Ir ← obtain r plane of P ;
3 IR1s ← DNA encode Ir with fi;
4 IR1s ← DNA transform Ir via Eqs. (8, 9);
5 C˜Cr ← DNA decode IR1s with f−1j
6 return C˜Cr
7 CC0r ← obtain r plane of CC0;
8 CC85r ← obtain r plane of CC85;
9 CC170r ← obtain r plane of CC170;
10 CC255r ← obtain r plane of CC255;
11 for i← 0 to 7 do
12 for j ← 0 to 7 do
13 K0 ← EncryptRs(P0,S3, i, j)  CC0r ;
14 K85 ← EncryptRs(P85,S3, i, j)  CC85r ;
15 K170 ← EncryptRs(P170,S3, i, j)  CC170r ;
16 K255 ← EncryptRs(P255,S3, i, j)  CC255r ;
17 if K0 == K85 == K170 == K255 then
18 E1 ← i;
19 D1 ← j;
20 S4 ←K0;
21 Print keys E1, D1 and S4;
22 end
23 end
24 end
TABLE VI
ORIGINAL KEYS SETUP AND CALCULATED EQUIVALENT KEYS FOR MPPS
Original keys Calculated equivalent keys
K1 = (0.11, 3.91) S1 = {9, 1, 10, 2, 11, 5, 7, 3, 12, 6, 4, 8}
K2 = (0.12, 3.92) S2 = {5, 6, 6, 2, 8, 7}
K3 = (0.13, 3.93) S3 = {0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0}
K4 = (0.14, 3.94) S4 = {99, 172, 189, 130}
K5 = (0.15, 3.95) S5 = {155, 45, 47, 189}
K6 = (0.16, 3.96) S6 = {193, 122, 164, 238}
Then, input four pairs of images, (P0,CC0), (P85,CC85),
(P170,CC170), (P255,CC255), into Algorithm 1 with S3.
As a result, the matching equivalent keys E1, D1 (DNA
encoding/decoding rule index) are successfully searched, and
the corresponding keystreams Sˆ4 are also output. Simi-
larly, multiple matching equivalent keys (E1, E2, D2, Sˆ5),
(E2, E3, D3, Sˆ6) of g and b plane, can be obtained by the
key search method, respectively, where Sˆ4 = S4, Sˆ5 =
S5 S5 S6 and Sˆ6 = S6 S4. The corresponding results
are shown in Table VII. Note that these searched keys need
to be further filtered because some of them are wrong. For
example, E1 = 2, 7, 1 or 5 are the wrong keys because they
don’t appear in both key search results (the first and second
columns).
Now we choose another group of images to obtain the
permutation index S1, it includes d log256(3 × 2 × 2)e = 1
image. Such as a pair of plain-image and cipher-image:
Pnew = {0, 1, 2, 3; 4, 5, 6, 7; 8, 9, 10, 11},
Cnew = {202, 48, 210, 196; 99, 72, 106, 17; 60, 76, 231, 205}.
Select any group of keys from Table VII, such as
(E1, D1, Sˆ4) = (0, 1, {201, 6, 23, 40}), (E1, E2, D2, Sˆ5)
= (0, 1, 0, {147, 81, 156, 123}) and (E2, E3, D3, Sˆ6) =
(1, 1, 1, {247, 131, 76, 57}). By Eq. (21) and keys Sˆ4, Sˆ5, Sˆ6,
one can obtain an intermediate image
C˜new = {169, 95, 86, 148; 172, 93, 90, 150; 84, 80, 92, 80}.
Then using DNA subtraction (the inverse of Eq. 10) and DNA
decoding (the inverse of Eqs. 8 and 9), one can get a scrambled
image
P˜new = {8, 0, 9, 1, 10, 4, 6, 2, 11, 5, 3, 7}.
By comparing the positions of the same pixels between P new
and P˜new, a permutation index sequence
S1 = {9, 1, 10, 2, 11, 5, 7, 3, 12, 6, 4, 8} (23)
can be obtained.
In general, by choosing five pairs of plain-images and
cipher-images, we can uniquely determine the equivalent keys
S1 and S3, which are consistent with Table VI. In addition,
we have eight different (E1, D1, Sˆ4), eight (E2, D2, Sˆ5) and
sixteen (E3, D3, Sˆ6), so there are 8× 8× 16 = 1024 groups
of equivalent keys in total, and one of them is the same as
in Table VI. Therefore, the proposed attack is effective and
feasible.
D. Evaluation on other attack analysis
In [26, Sec. IV], the performance of MPPS was analyzed
from eight aspects. In this subsection, we question their
credibility one by one as follows.
1) Key space: The statement “it can be evident that the
coupled chaotic map achieves amplified chaotic range in the
entire region of [0, 4]” in [26] is questionable. The size of each
sub-figure in [26, Fig. 1] is about 0.9 inch by 0.9 inch. Assume
that the adopted dpi (dots per inch) is 200, the number of the
printed dots is only about 32,400. Observing [26, Fig. 1], one
can see that the distribution is not uniform.
Since symmetry in fixed-point arithmetic domain for initial
value of CCS (1) and CLT (3) (namely, the initial values Y (0)
and (1−Y (0)) will generate the same dynamic behavior), the
effective key space of the MPPS is reduced by half. On the
other hand, the initial values Y (0) = 0, 0.5 or 1.0 are the fixed
points of CCS and CLT, which correspond to some weak keys
of the MPPS. In addition, the key space of K2 is estimated
to be 1028 in [26], but its actual key space is only 86 = 218
since six kinds of DNA encoding /decoding rules. Further,
considering DNA encoding properties (Property 2, Property 3),
it will generate a part of weak keys and equivalent keys. In
general, the key space of MPPS is far overestimated.
2) Key Sensitivity: As analyzed in [28]–[30], there are
many equivalent secret-key due to the dynamics degradation
of chaotic system in a finite-precision computer.
3) Statistical Attack: Histogram analysis and entropy are
unrelated with any security performance of an encryption
scheme [29], [30].
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TABLE VII
ALL POSSIBLE EQUIVALENT KEYS REVEALED 1
(E1, D1, Sˆ4) (E1, E2, D2, Sˆ5) (E2, E3, D3, Sˆ6)
(0, 1, Sˆ
(1)
4 ), (4, 5, Sˆ
(1)
4 ) (0, 1, 0, Sˆ
(1)
5 ), (0, 5, 4, Sˆ
(1)
5 ), (4, 1, 0, Sˆ
(1)
5 ), (4, 5, 4, Sˆ
(1)
5 ) (1, 1, 1, Sˆ
(1)
6 ), (1, 5, 5, Sˆ
(1)
6 ), (5, 1, 1, Sˆ
(1)
6 ), (5, 5, 5, Sˆ
(1)
6 )
(0, 3, Sˆ
(2)
4 ), (4, 6, Sˆ
(2)
4 ) (0, 1, 2, Sˆ
(2)
5 ), (0, 5, 7, Sˆ
(2)
5 ), (4, 1, 2, Sˆ
(2)
5 ), (4, 5, 7, Sˆ
(2)
5 ) (1, 1, 3, Sˆ
(2)
6 ), (1, 5, 6, Sˆ
(2)
6 ), (5, 1, 3, Sˆ
(2)
6 ), (5, 5, 6, Sˆ
(2)
6 )
(0, 5, Sˆ
(3)
4 ), (4, 1, Sˆ
(3)
4 ) (0, 1, 4, Sˆ
(3)
5 ), (0, 5, 0, Sˆ
(3)
5 ), (4, 1, 4, Sˆ
(3)
5 ), (4, 5, 0, Sˆ
(3)
5 ) (1, 1, 5, Sˆ
(3)
6 ), (1, 5, 1, Sˆ
(3)
6 ), (5, 1, 5, Sˆ
(3)
6 ), (5, 5, 1, Sˆ
(3)
6 )
(0, 6, Sˆ
(4)
4 ), (4, 3, Sˆ
(4)
4 ) (0, 1, 7, Sˆ
(4)
5 ), (0, 5, 2, Sˆ
(4)
5 ), (4, 1, 7, Sˆ
(4)
5 ), (4, 5, 2, Sˆ
(4)
5 ) (1, 1, 6, Sˆ
(4)
6 ), (1, 5, 3, Sˆ
(4)
6 ), (5, 1, 6, Sˆ
(4)
6 ), (5, 5, 3, Sˆ
(4)
6 )
(2, 1, Sˆ
(5)
4 ), (7, 5, Sˆ
(5)
4 ) (1, 0, 0, Sˆ
(5)
5 ), (1, 4, 4, Sˆ
(5)
5 ), (5, 0, 0, Sˆ
(5)
5 ), (5, 4, 4, Sˆ
(5)
5 ) (3, 3, 1, Sˆ
(5)
6 ), (3, 6, 5, Sˆ
(5)
6 ), (6, 3, 1, Sˆ
(5)
6 ), (6, 6, 5, Sˆ
(5)
6 )
(2, 3, Sˆ
(6)
4 ), (7, 6, Sˆ
(6)
4 ) (1, 0, 2, Sˆ
(6)
5 ), (1, 4, 7, Sˆ
(6)
5 ), (5, 0, 2, Sˆ
(6)
5 ), (5, 4, 7, Sˆ
(6)
5 ) (3, 3, 3, Sˆ
(6)
6 ), (3, 6, 6, Sˆ
(6)
6 ), (6, 3, 3, Sˆ
(6)
6 ), (6, 6, 6, Sˆ
(6)
6 )
(2, 5, Sˆ
(7)
4 ), (7, 1, Sˆ
(7)
4 ) (1, 0, 4, Sˆ
(7)
5 ), (1, 4, 0, Sˆ
(7)
5 ), (5, 0, 4, Sˆ
(7)
5 ), (5, 4, 0, Sˆ
(7)
5 ) (3, 3, 5, Sˆ
(7)
6 ), (3, 6, 1, Sˆ
(7)
6 ), (6, 3, 6, Sˆ
(7)
6 ), (6, 6, 1, Sˆ
(7)
6 )
(2, 6, Sˆ
(8)
4 ), (7, 3, Sˆ
(8)
4 ) (1, 0, 7, Sˆ
(8)
5 ), (1, 4, 2, Sˆ
(8)
5 ), (5, 0, 7, Sˆ
(8)
5 ), (5, 4, 2, Sˆ
(8)
5 ) (3, 3, 6, Sˆ
(8)
6 ), (3, 6, 3, Sˆ
(8)
6 ), (6, 3, 6, Sˆ
(8)
6 ), (6, 6, 3, Sˆ
(8)
6 )
1 The red number means that Ei appears in both columns, where i = 1, 2. For example, when E1 in the first column is only 0 or 4, it also appears in the
second column. While the underline indicates the correct equivalent keys selected, all of which have a red Ei. Sˆ
(i)
m represents ith different keystream
Sˆm, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8},m ∈ {4, 5, 6}. Due to space constraints, only certain relationships between them are given here.
4) Differential Attack: According to Property 1, the differ-
ence of cipher-image is unrelated to the keys S4, S5 and S6,
which will greatly reduce the effective key space. Therefore,
MPPS is vulnerable to differential attack.
5) Chosen-plaintext attack: One specific relationship be-
tween plain-image and the corresponding cipher-image is
almost unrelated with the capability of an encryption scheme
against chosen-plaintext attack.
6) Cropping Attack: If the encryption process is not related
with the plain-image, any encryption scheme is robust against
cropping attack.
7) Performance Comparison: As emphasize in [25], any
encryption scheme should target at a specific application sce-
nario. Otherwise, the balancing point among usability, security
and efficiency is unclear.
E. Other defects
1) Practical consideration: In [26, Sec. III], it is stated that
“selection of a region of interest and region of non-interest
is solely left to the user under the recommended physician”.
In addition, MPPS “requires the user’s feed that specifies the
number of rounds of operation”. So it requires professional
training for the ordinary patients.
2) Efficiency: As analyzed in [29], conversion functions (4),
(6) waste much computation on the discard bits. To generate
a sequence of length six X2, t2 = 100 states are sacrificed.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed security and practical performances of
a medical privacy protection scheme based on DNA encoding
and chaos. Some of its properties were derived and used to
obtain the equivalent secret key of the scheme with some
chosen plain-images. Much works need to be done to bridge
the gap between DNA computing and multimedia security.
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